312 571 [613] [596] in the following turn it will take it up at night, and with another order among the irrigators in which the first in one turn will be the last in the next. These two classes of turns, this order of irrigation, is usually set up for the whole duration; when it is begun, the irrigators draw lots with small sticks or twigs, and, at other times, it is set up differently every day. The transfer of

312 571 425 [432] [805] [435] turns is free, as is the decision of the person to be favored. Turns of water are the object of buying and selling, and are independent of land. A 12-hour turn every week (eight days) comes to some 500 or 600 duros (1939).[124]

312 [821] The hour to begin irrigating is that of the rising or setting of the sun, according to whether the turn itself is diurnal or nocturnal. The repairs depend on their importance and where they are made, the users of the branch in question contributing to these, downstream. The outlets or cuts of water are the responsibility of

312 571 805 the individual who is irrigating at the time. The duration of turns was regulated by means of natural hours, those of the prayers, and by measurements of the shade and the angle of the same with some object, in other words, a true sun dial.

312 627 628 671 Differences were resolved, as noted, by means of arbitration, valuation or assessment, or indemnification, apart from governmental intervention if this is deemed necessary, as some <u>qanuns</u> express.

312 184 The variations in the treatment of ditches require the conformity of all the ditch-users to be expressed by themselves or their representatives personally, in a meeting convoked to this effect on the sites which are to be the objects of modification, in the system or traditions of irrigation.

695 is to be found situated above the ditch of 'Umar bin Yusif al-Waryaghli.
312
[693] This is what the witnesses of the present (act) certify without there being (any) doubt existing in it. A complete attestation.

693 The undersigned notaries who have compiled (the testimonies which
695 these individuals afforded) from them testify that the latter are in a perfect state of legal capacity (i.e. of sound mind and memory) to testify, and they know them (i.e. personally).

[805] On the 21st day of the blessed Sha'ban of the year 1150 (December 13, 1737). Two illegible signatures follow.

19. PURCHASE AND SALE OF AN IRRIGATION TURN: TRANSLATION:

Praise be to the one God.

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571
432 The Qa'id Sulaiman bin Muhammad al-Waryaghli al-Khattabi al-Ajdiri[176] buys, with the power and force of God, from the one who sells it, Siddiq bin Muhammad bin Siddiq al-'Abdallawi[177], one-fourth (of a part) of the irrigation ditch of Bulma'iz, (in his turn) by day or by night, his turn reappearing about (once) every nine days; on some occasions
432 he gets it during the day, and on others at night. A valid, definitive
[435] and firm purchase, so much down, without conditions of resale or op-
[436] tions (to anything) other than that assigned here), for a price the sum of which is 100 duros, in Spanish money (i.e. 500 pesetas). This amount the abovementioned seller has taken from the abovementioned buyer, thus recognizing it in front of both witnesses instrumental to the present act, freeing the buyer from it, who took over his purchase with complete possession, occupying it in his place of ownership in conformity with the traditional law and the right of rehibitory action

000 In my humble opinion there is more than enough water for the surface area which can be irrigated; and so much more, in fact, that the amount which is lost is greater than that which is put to use.

312 (499) Calculating grosso modo an irrigable area of 5000 hectars, bounded by the main road on the west, as well as a subalveal flow of over 1 cubic meter per second from the Nkur River, according to the approximate calculations made when the supports of the new bridge (i.e. crossing the river at Km. 20 to the Axt Tuzin and Melilla) were set up, it would not be far off the mark to estimate the flow in both rivers, plus that of Thifarwin (in the Aith Bu 'Ayyash) at some 3 cubic meters per second, or 10,000 cubic meters per hour; and this would give daily 48 cubic meters per hectar under permanent irrigation.

Most of this water is now lost in the sea....and represents several millions of pesetas lost while technicians, policy makers and businessmen show no iterest.

(591) (435) (241) It should be remembered that a single turn of irrigation water every eight days costs 500 to 600 duros in the Plain of al-Husaima, and continually produces two harvests a year.

Ghis:

Ditch of Bufma'iz -- May 20, 1938 -- carried 131 liters per second

Ditch of r-Bzimma -- May 20, 1938 -- carried 46 liters per second

Nkur:

Ditch of Aghzar Amzzyan -- May 20, 1938 -- carried 770 liters per second

Ditch of Thimsaman -- May 20, 1938 -- carried 770 liters per second

Ditch of Sidd Jdid -- May 20, 1938 -- carried about 40 liters per second

Ditch of 'Ain Harri -- May 20, 1938 -- carried about 40 liters per second

Ditch of Swani -- May 20, 1938 -- carried about 40 liters per second

231 There are practically no communal events,
796 and few pertaining to individual life crises, which can be accom-
782 plished without the sacrifice of an animal. Perhaps this social
231 and ceremonial significance of animals among a sedentary, horti-
182 cultural people can be explained by the fact that they live by a
[791] religion whose manifest forms of spiritual observation developed among pastoral transhumants. I do not mean to imply that goats and sheep are as important in the lives of the Berbers as are camels to the Bedouin or cattle to the Nuer. The economic base of the Riffian is perhaps too diversified for such psychological domination to take place. Nor were there the same sort of feuds between goat herdsmen as exist with camel or cattle. If, however, we regard livestock as merely secondary food sources in the economic sphere, we shall miss its importance to the social life and institutional structure of the Rif and hence misevaluate its true economic significance.

121 In the discourse which follows I shall be dealing with economic units of extremely small scale. To a reader oriented to the scale of economic transaction which takes place in post-industrial society, the examples used may seem irrelevant to an examination of economic organization. My problem, nonetheless, 433 impels me to use such examples. Waterson (1962:4) estimates that 435 the annual per capita output of the fellah in traditional [191] Moroccan agriculture is 30,000 francs or $60. In the Rif, which is regarded as one of the poorest sections of Morocco, 231 the figure is probably lower. Yet my data on the average prices 435

231 of livestock during normal market conditions show a mule to be
435 worth $100 or more, a donkey between $40 and $60. Cows range
from $50 to $70, and bulls upward to $100. Rams sell for $20
[454] to $30, and goats for $10. Given the resources of the Riffian,
expenditures of this magnitude represent expensive investments.

(real or putative) in such matters, his reputation expanded from a localized base to a regional and even a national one. Upon the death of a holy man a shrine would be erected to serve as a permanent place which the tribesmen could visit. To such places the Berbers come to petition for divine intermediacy. They seek remedy for ill health, barrenness, and so forth, either on their own behalf or for a friend or relative. Although pilgrimages can be made at any time, there are also various saints in the Rif that attract several thousand people on specific celebration days. These communal affairs are annual events and must be added to the schedule of pilgrimages for individualistic causes. The part of the pilgrimage which shall concern us is the economic aspects.

The expense of such a pilgrimage depends on several factors. There is always a sacrificial element but the type of animal to be killed is not specified. It is generally believed that the more costly the sacrifice the greater the baraka that the saint will pass on. Thus although chickens are often used, a lamb or goat is preferred to increase the efficacy. The sacrificial animal itself is divided three ways, with the pilgrimage party receiving a third which is consumed on the site. Another third goes to the moqaddem who is in charge of maintaining the shrine, and the final third goes to the poor who live in the vicinity of the tomb.

As an example of the costs involved in even a short pilgrimage to a local shrine, we might examine the pilgrimage of a group of eight women and four men who were traveling to the

788 cemetery of Sidi Malik in the community of Had Ruadi in the tribe
778 of Iboyyia in the summer of 1966. They had come from the frac-
435 tion of Arba Taurirt in the Beni Wariyaghar. At least one of the
[755] pilgrims was ill, presumably suffering from the effects of the
[954] evil eye or a djnoun, one of the most prevalent causes for visit-
[494] ing a holy place. The group had left Arba on the seven o'clock
[782] bus for Alhucemas where they had taken another bus to Had Ruadi,
where they spent the night. Four chickens were brought and killed
at the tomb. The next day they returned to Arba by way of
Alhucemas. The cost of the journey itself can be calculated
fairly closely. Each person had to pay 5 dirhams to go from
Arba to Alhucemas and an additional 3 dirhams to go from Alhucemas
to Had. There was an expense of 8 dirhams to make the trip and
another 8 to return, or 16 dirhams ($3.20) for each person. The
chickens can roughly be priced at 10 dirhams apiece, or having a
cash value of $8.00. The total expense for the group was at
least $45, a not inconsiderable outlay of cash and goods, espe-
cially if we recall Waterson's per capita output of the fellah
family is $60. If this were a mere isolated instance such expense
would be negligible in terms of the entire society. The pilgrim-
age is, however, part of the texture of Rif society and such
instances form the pattern rather than the exception.

792 Some of the more ambitious holy men and their followers
794 have set up rather unique firms, the religious brotherhood, a
575 form of voluntary association of such prominence in north Africa.
(A detailed account of one such order is given by Evans-Pritchard,

792
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[124] annual income may be claimed. Informants agreed that a figure of 5% of annual income might not be an inaccurate sum for a member to donate to his zariwya.

788
484 Aside from these rather special claims on one's sum of wealth are the regular demands made by one's being a member of
[179] the Islamic community. Perhaps the most difficult of these obligations for the Riffian is the hadj or pilgrimage to Hijaz, Mecca, the birthplace of Mohammed, and to Medina where he died.
[805] The hadj itself takes place between the seventh and the thirteenth of the twelfth month of the Muslim calendar, the Dhu
[178] 'l-Hijja. While in former days men traveled in caravans or
[509] by boat, the most popular form of locomotion today is Air Maroc which offers special rates during the period of the pilgrimage. Although the number of Riffians making the trip is, in any one year, not proportionately large, it is a rather significant group.
[435] The investment is large, ranging from 3,000 to 6,000 dirhams, depending on the means of transportation and the time spent in
[671] getting there and back. If one has a family, which is generally the case, one must (by law) leave behind enough money to provide for their expenses while the pilgrim is away. Only the older,
[554] wealthier (and as a consequence most respected) Berbers can become al-Hadj, the honorific title bestowed on those who have
788 completed the journey to Mecca. The trip is not, however, com-
484 pletely voluntary. If a man is prominent and in the minds of
626 the populace of the community well-off, there is a good deal of pressure placed on him, in the form of ridicule, gossip and general public disapproval, if he begs off the pilgrimage.

000 general public disapproval, if he begs off the pilgrimage. The
788 authority that al-Hadj possesses is quite real and the man who
484 feels his resources might be better deployed for profit-making
554 enterprises will not carry this authority within the community. If [illegible] wishes to maintain a position of prominence in the Rif and is fifty years or older, it is practically mandatory for him to travel to Mecca.

796 While the hadj does not affect all the Rif economically the ceremony of the Great Feast or Aid al-Kebir which is held all over the Muslim world on the tenth day of Dhu 'l-Hijja has
[782] a universal application. On this date every family head must sacrifice a ram to commemorate God's beneficence in allowing Abraham to sacrifice a lamb in the stead of his son Ishmael.

796 The month preceding this ceremony is one of intense
571 anxiety for the poor, for they must acquire either the animal
602 or the money by which to get one. Many of the Riffians have a
435 stock of animals from which they can select the sacrificial ram.
[152] Those who do not must rely on their wealthier sponsors, either
[231] relatives or business associates. The price of rams spirals upwards as the day of Aid al-Kebir approaches, reaching its climax the day before the celebration. Men who normally earn a subsistence wage in Alhucemas or Targuist begin to spend more time among their relatives in the countryside as they attempt to reinforce their communal support within the traditional cul-
796 tural setting. In many ways the celebration is comparable to
435 Christmas in Christian countries, except that the expenses

796 435 involved in celebrating Christmas can be adjusted to household income, whereas the expenses of Aid al-Kebir have a fixed character below which one is culturally not allowed to go.

796 785 Although the celebration of Aid al-Kebir is regarded by the Berbers as the most expensive, there are several other events in the cycle of religious festivals which have economic repercussions. The most important of these is Ramadan, the fasting month for Muslims. During the entirety of this month, the ninth in the Muslim lunar calendar, the Riffians fast from sunrise to sunset. [461] The lack of food during the day decreases the amount of energy one can expend on production. The period is a particularly difficult one if it falls during the summer months with their long and hot days (water is also prohibited) or during critical production months such as the ploughing period or harvest time. The [264] usual practice among the fellah is to rise at three o'clock in the morning and eat a final meal before day breaks. They then retire and attempt to sleep as long into the day as possible. [461] [369] Wage labor in the city suffers especially, since their work pattern is established along more rigid lines. The fasting 796 785 472 443 period has particularly devastating effects on the entrepreneurs at the weekly markets. Because travel is so difficult during Ramadan, the suqs are rather skimpily attended. Men who prepare [265] and vend food at the marketplace simply go out of business for 796 785 the duration of the period. The end of Ramadan is marked by the Little Festival or Aid as-Saghir. Aid as-Saghir is naturally a time of rejoicing since the period of fasting has come to an end.

754 791 789 793 443 wares in public, while the fqihs are busily selling their charms in the seclusion of the tea and hashish shops that ring the same market.

To the best of my knowledge Justinard was the first to describe the phenomenon in the Rif:

> Les Rifains croient beaucoup aux amulettes et aux sortilèges, aux pratiques occultes qui servent à nuire à un ennemi, à le faire mourir, à forcer l'amour, a obtenir une guérison. C'est surtout l'affaire des Telbas [fqih] et des vieilles femmes (1926:57).

791 754 789 435 The costs of the services of such magical specialists vary with the seriousness of the difficulty. Women generally pay in kind since they have such meager resources at their disposal. Men usually pay cash. A love potion may cost no more than a liter of olive oil or a dime. Prolonged medical healing may [755] require several thousand dirhams and accommodation for the sorcerer in food and lodging over a lengthy period of time. One [755] of my informants kept a pair of magicians in his house for six months in an attempt to restore his mother's eyesight. Another informant, a woman who herself was regarded as having supernatural power, estimated that she had spent the equivalent of fifty dollars over a decade to ward off various evil eyes. The magi- [554] cians of the Rif are, however, not known for their potency and for special problems, magicians or holy men are imported from the Ghomara or the Sus.

[755] As can be seen from the above, much magic is devoted to 000 curing illness. Most sickness is attributed to evil spirits,

754 and one can get it not only from people who dislike you but from
[152] people who love you. The eye is thought to most often result from jealousy, and one of the social mechanisms for constraining hubris is that pride over secular success will bring disaster upon the individual.

754 The fear of the evil eye runs counter to another major
556 principle in the Rif, the conspicuous display of prosperity as
152 a mechanism to increase prestige. The balance between avoiding jealousy and being successful is rather difficult to maintain. In any economic action the aspect of success has a countervailing feature of disaster. Although the evil eye resembles the djnoun
[753] in that it conveys the same sort of misfortune in the form of
[796] death and disease, there is one critical difference. The djnoun is regarded as an independent agent operating of its own volition, while the evil eye operates through a specific human agent.
[578] The evil eye is the more dangerous of the two because it increases friction within the community between families or within the same family. The incentive to earn profit is curbed by the fear of attracting misfortune through the evil eye. One man who had set up a small store to sell tea, oil, sugar, and the like, dressed his children in increasingly scruffy clothing in order that his economic success would not attract envy.

751 Aside from the avoidance patterns caused by the evil eye, amulets are considered particularly efficacious as a protective
[793] device. The amulets are generally prepared by the fqih, who
[435] inscribes them with sayings from the Koran. Prices for these

751 vary greatly, from less than a dirham to several hundred dirhams.
435 Although it is impossible to estimate how much money goes for investments of this sort, the qualitative importance of investments to prevent misfortune from the evil eye is great.

One other rite ought to be mentioned of imitative magic
796 directly related to production. Since crops are dry farmed,
241 the success of any one year depends on the amount of rain
789 received in that year. Unfortunately, the Rif is not blessed
821 with a stable rainfall. When there is drought or even the fear of impending drought, each community in the Central Rif has a Bride-of-the-Rain ceremony (thasrith anzar). For such a ceremony a ladle normally used to put bread into the household ovens is dressed in the costume of a bride. The young female virgins
[533] carry this 'bride' from house to house within their community,
[539] singing the refrain,

s-reeth-nis-la
arabe ya-sidi
atawah- n-shala

Give us Oh God
Give us water quickly
Make water quickly.

They stop at each household to receive coins and prepared food.
[782] At the same time, all the men go to the communal mosque or a nearby saint's tomb where they sacrifice a bull purchased with contributions for everyone in the community. After the ceremony the meat is distributed among the participants. Although this example is related to both consumption and production, it would

454 Just as acquiring the capital for an investment has its own distinct forms, the actual investment itself appears to be motivated more often than not by social incentive rather than by profit. Aside from such investments as were mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, we encounter investments which have, from the standpoint of industrial ideology, a more utilitarian aspect. 231 Thus, an extra mule or an ox can raise the level of productivity 454 of its owner. What more often occurs, however, is that in the 433 case of such prestige-laden animals, their effect is primarily 554 in the role of prestige and only secondarily in production. Perhaps the most dramatic representation of such investment are the animals which are purchased during the summer months. It is during this period that traveling is at its optimum, and owners leave their newly acquired livestock grazing conspicuously along the roadside for the public to observe. Unfortunately, work animals serve almost no productivity function during the summer months. With the commencement of winter, fodder supplies decrease and it becomes necessary to sell the extra animal before it can be put to a utilitarian purpose.

256 Another example of the primacy of the social incentive is 435 the business of milling. The turbine wheel mill powered by water 492 is one of the few nonagricultural enterprises which the fellah [376] engage in. The operation of a mill in the Rif bears little resemblance to the operations of a firm as a profit-making organization. In the first instance, cost for the service of a mill is not determined by any market factor, but by custom. The owner of

256 the mill collects a tenth of all the flour he processes, regard-
435 less of the level of demand or any market condition. While mills
472 are not economically competitive with one another, they are soci-
256
472 ally competitive. As one informant put it: "My father was better
477 than his, my grandfather better than his grandfather. If he has a mill, why shouldn't we?" If there is only one mill in a locality, which is a fairly rare circumstance, the entire community uses it. However, if there are two or more mills, the basis of
[571] preference on the part of the users is not determined by conveni-
[578] ence of location of the mill but in terms of social factors such
[602] as either ancient antagonisms stemming from the blood feuds of the past or familial alliance based on marriage or kinship.

423 Just as social motives and strictures lie behind the uses
427 of capital, so too do they influence the regulation of labor. We see this in a series of sharecropping associations which arise between a man who has more property than he alone can personally cultivate (or who is prohibited from manual labor by his social and/or religious status, such as some shorfa) and a person who holds less land than he can cultivate to meet the subsistence needs of his family. The latter may or may not be a property holder, although usually he does have a small plot of his own. Land fragmentation through the peculiarities of Islamic inheritance has, however, reduced many plots to sizes too small to meet such subsistence needs as a family requires. In these cir-
[464] cumstances the Riffian hires out to those who have managed to keep larger estates or have acquired land through purchase.

443 I shall now attempt to schematize the suq in the Central Rif. While this diagram may not include all classes of participants nor all exchanges, I think it covers the majority of all cases. The buyers and sellers in the weekly market can be divided into three separate categories. The first are the tribal fellah, rooted socially in the local community. Unquestionably, this group constitutes the vast majority of people at the suq. Whatever economic interaction they have with the suq is prompted by acquiring cash to finance social expenditures or to provide a limited range of goods such as cooking oil, kerosene, sugar, tea, salt and so forth, for household consumption. The majority of persons in this category, the poor fellah, have brought their small lots of goods derived from their agricultural activities to exchange at whatever the prevailing price in order to obtain cash for making equally small purchases. They do not seek to accumulate surpluses of cash so that they can market larger quantities of goods in successive market meetings.

443 442 434 435 The second category of people involved in any one market is made up of the large-scale merchants who have come to buy from the fellah. This group is completely impersonal, rarely if ever having any local connections with the populace. These merchants are well provided with capital, own their own trucks, and are knowledgeable about supply and demand conditions in both the local and national markets in which they operate. In the case of most large-scale buyers, they are accompanied by a group of hired men who seek out market information. These informants

443 gather up verbal information about the prevailing prices and the
442 supply of a commodity in the suq. Their operation is somewhat
434 more complex than the sellers who can quickly assess the supply
435 of the market since they need only evaluate the quantities of their competitors. The large-scale buyers do not have such early information and must rely on their "runners" to supply them with market conditions on the inpouring of a commodity into the market. The centers of these operations are quite exciting as information pours into them and the merchant sends out his buying price.

443 While the lot size of his purchases is uniformly small (buying
442 from the numerous fellah who have only small lots to sell), the large-scale merchant departs from the market with a sizable supply
442 of his good. At the end of market day he is assessed a tax based
[651] on the quantity he has purchased and transports the merchandise to urban centers where even larger firms purchase the good either to transform it into another sort of goods, through an industrial or factory process, or to break it down into small lots again to sell at a higher price. The principle behind his operation is simple. By his act of transporting commodities away from the area in which they were produced to another area in which they are scarce, he multiplies the value of the goods.

443 Amongst themselves such buyers have a rather accurate idea
435 of the prevailing prices among their competitors at the market-
442 place. Whatever price differential that exists at the market develops from the efficiency of information gathering. By this word-of-mouth information the buyer is able to estimate market

443 442 435 conditions and adjust his prices accordingly. The fellah, on the other hand, has no such information channel and merely attempts to get the best price he can with his limited supply of information. The fellah sells his eggs, or almonds, or oranges, to the big buyers almost as soon as he contacts one of them at the marketplace. Since his lots are so small, any fluctuation in the price of the commodity during the day would only remotely affect him and he prefers to get his selling activity over with quickly so that he can get on to his other market activities--buying and social intercourse. It would be far from the market style of the Berber to spend hours prowling the suq in search of an optimum moment to sell. Only in those commodities which the producer sells directly to the consumer (fellah to fellah) is there much time spent in marketing goods. Only in the absence of the large-scale merchant must the tribesman await the disposition of his goods.

It is only on rare occasions that the large-scale merchant attempts to sell what he has bought in the same market. The only instances that I know of were in the case of selling to wholesalers or restaurant owners from the city of Alhucemas who came to the rural suqs to buy for their immediate need, taking advantage of special friendships and buying in lots so large that the price advantage for the large-scale merchants of transporting to another area was offset by the quantity of the purchase. This, however, was rare. Most merchants of this magnitude attempted to derive their profits through their transporting facility.

443 The third group is those merchants who exclusively sell
442 at the market. As noted above, this is merely an analytic device. Empirically, a buyer in one market will be a seller in another. It is only the special ecological conditions of the Rif which separate the two categories in the marketplaces. There is, however, a major dichotomy which splits this group, based mainly on scale of operation. On the one hand are the large-scale sellers who resemble, in terms of organization, the large-scale buyers and who derive their profit mainly through the transportational facility. On the other hand, we have the small-scale merchant who sells his goods and services only in a cycle of small local markets.

443 The small-scale sellers hold in common with the large merchants only the fact that their basic activity is to sell. The difference is essentially in scale. The small-scale merchant or occupational specialist travels from one market within a carefully defined region to the next market. He has no con-
[494] [492] nections outside his immediate circuit and gets from one place to the next on public transportation or mule. He has little knowledge of market conditions outside his immediate view of
[435] [437] a single market. His prices, which may involve a good deal of bargaining, vary only slightly from customer to customer and
443 445 from market to market. He may be divided into two empirical categories: those who sell services, such as barbers, butchers, shoe repairmen, food vendors, blacksmiths, solderers, etc., and those who keep a small inventory of nonperishable goods, such

442 profit not from dispersing goods in the same marketplace but in
571 transporting the goods from one region to another.
[443]

Large-scale buyers interact with small-lot sellers in a limited range of goods which, generally, can be transformed by industrial processes into another commodity (grapes to wine, almonds to cosmetics, oranges to canned fruit), the conversion of which enhances the value of the original object. These buyers are plugged into a larger economy with export connections and are
442 sensitive to external conditions. Tribesmen who produce in order
433 to meet the demand of such buyers are likewise closely connected
434 with the national and international economy. There is a small but growing number of fellah who produce to sell to this group, but even among them there is a reticence to move completely into the commercial sector. My impression is that the great majority of the Riffian peasantry engaging in cash-cropping attempt to maintain a balance in their production schedule which continues to include a fair proportion of traditional crops. By generalizing their production, few of the grape specialists suffered from
[458] the decrease in prices during 1965. This contrasts with the one-
[435] crop estates in Algeria which during the same period suffered severe setbacks.

443 The small-scale sellers of both goods and services occupy that position which is left open by the unwillingness of the local Berber to engage in full-time commerce and the absence
[434] of the large-scale entrepreneur. They are, on the one hand, dealing in commodities or services the margin of profit on which

443 434 is too low for the large-scale merchants to intrude in competition. The type of commodity (clothes, kerosene, and so on) cannot be increased in value through combination and transportation, [438] [435] while at the same time the volume of trade is so sporadic and low that only the one-man operation can derive a living from it. We might assume that wherever there exists an adequate margin of profit through combination and increase in scale, the large-scale firm will preempt this position. The leftovers, so to speak, go to the small middleman operation. On the other hand, these small-443 182 scale merchants are performing services which have a low cultural value among the local population. Thus the small-scale seller of goods and services fills a vacuum. He cannot be displaced by the large firms, since it would not be profitable for them to compete with him. At the same time, he serves the local community by providing necessary but socially disapproved of services.

443 438 Finally, the tribesmen interact amongst themselves--producers selling to household consumers. Since the fellah's trade is always in small lots (with the exception of livestock), most transactions in this sector are on a very small scale. Lack of capital and limited interest in the market characterize this group. Sellers seek to dispose of their product at whatever the prevailing price as quickly as possible. Buyers choose mainly in terms of quality of the commodity rather than price, which tends to be even--each seller listening to his neighbor seller and selling accordingly. There is very little differential in this group in product or price. The cause behind this lies,

443 townsmen were traders who carried their vegetables and flowers
829 on foot or bus to distant parts of the regional market in order to achieve maximum profits. The Riffian seeks only to make an exchange in his local market in order that he might get back to the more important aspects of his life.

443 Such exchange, however, is not without calculation. As I
438 mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Berber goes to his local
182 suq because it satisfies certain social needs. He likewise frequents the market because it offers him clear-cut economic
443 advantage. It is here that he has acquaintances among the mer-
438 chants, craftsmen and occupational specialists with whom he has
571 certain guarantees, based on familiarity, that he will receive a fair price. Such assurance is absent in a foreign market.
[609] Invariably, the stranger pays more for a service or good than the regular customer. In the most important aspect of trade, that of livestock, this consideration is coupled with that of
443 transportation. From the standpoint of seeking out the best
438 price based on multiple competition, the larger the market,
●435 the better the prices. In the long run, the best price for animals exists in the larger markets and one knows beforehand that an animal sold in Had Ruadi or Arba Taurirt will fetch a lower price than at Beni Bu Iyash. Yet to sell in such a market the fellah is faced with almost insurmountable difficulties. Should he take his livestock--a goat tied across the back of his mule or a cow herded along on foot--to a market further than his local suq, he must return the animal home or be entirely

443 dependent on the prices existing in the market for that day.
438 On the other hand, if he is dissatisfied with the price in the
435 local market he can easily transport the beast home again, to await a more propitious occasion.

443 I think that the major element which emerges from this
182 schematic presentation of the composition of the market and the
571 interaction of its various actors is that each fellah, as an individual, plays a relatively minor role in the workings of the market. The market brings together buyers and sellers, but the fellah have a different orientation than the other
443 buyers and sellers. Stemming from this difference in orienta-
182 tion is a basic difference in the form of economic activity. The primary concern of the professional merchant is to dispose of his products on the market, hopefully at a profit. The primary concern of the fellah is to meet subsistence and social needs. If he can do this by disposing of his crops or livestock on the market, all the better. But the market as such does not provide the dynamics of the Rif economy; the dynamics are provided by the impulses activated by the status economy.

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/footnote 1 continued/ of the Haha ("Organisation sociale et domestique des Haha /Social and Domestic Organization of the Haha/," pp. 10-11. Now there is an association of "ikhs" of diverse origins there. On the other hand, the bond of blood exists among the households of the same Riffian jemaᶜa.

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it includes about ten houses -- 30 to 40 hearths in all -- and becomes a group strong enough to defend itself. The "tarfiq" heads, willingly set off by the title of "amghar," are feared and respected because they can then assemble 40 or 50 "brothers" resolute for anything. For the most insignificant motive they take up arms and engage in bloody battles with the neighboring hamlets for long years. These are then veritable wars of extermination, which end only in the disappearance or exile of the vanquished. The following example, selected in the fraction of the Aït ᶜAbdallah, of the tribe of the Beni Ouriaghel, favorite country for soff struggles, will give the measure of the violence of these rivalries capable of breaking most of the social ties.

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Discord broke out not long ago between two villages, each peopled by a "tarfiq," the Aït Qasem and the Ibouneharen, following the killing of a dog that belonged to the guest of an amghar. When the Aït Qasem refused to pay the blood price of the dog, namely 50 douros, claimed by the amghar, it came to blows and to war. Twelve men were killed the first day. In the following years 40 men died on one side, 62 on the other, in regular combat, not counting those who were assassinated for vengeance. Finally, the defeated party decided to leave the country. Old men were then seen to take refuge with the women and children in the sacred mountain of the Zerhoun, after having sold their goods in order to be able, in one last effort, to buy a murderer who would avenge their dead. The conditions under which this last was to make the designated enemy disappear were carefully detailed and the stipulations passed before the ᶜadoul; if the shot killed the adversary, the recompense was /240/ 10,000

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621 /240 cont./
628 reals; 5,000 if it only wounded him; if the bullet missed its
613 goal, 2,500. The marksman, however, fortunate or awkward,
726 perished the next day, struck perhaps by a child hidden with a
[435] gun in a thicket of lentiscus.

It is understandable that under these conditions the notion of
613 "khoms" is often obscure; the only group that can exist then is
619 the family, around which assemble by bonds of adoption and marriage the weakest groups and the outsiders so as to form the "tarfiq."

613 Discords sometimes become so violent that material life
628 frequently stops; only the women then dare to go out into the fields; the men come to pray at the mosque without abandoning
613 their guns. In these circumstances, the family heads of the
628 whole country gather together in order to decide on a "ribat,"
675 which is respected for several months. This name is given to a solemn agreement that binds all the members of the neighboring tribes to repress, by means of very high fines, murders, rapes, large thefts, aggressions at the markets or on the roads leading to
[681] them. The sums paid by the guilty, which can climb to several thousand douros, are divided among the contracting tribes. The "amghars," heads of the most powerful families, have only the small personal part that goes to them just as to mere individuals.

628 Among the less turbulent tribes of the Rif, as at Targist, at
184 Zerqet, among the Beni Gmil, private wars have not reached as
621 great a development since the inhabitants still succeed in living grouped in hamlets. The "mouda[c]" or subfractions and even the
632 "khoms" sometimes summon all the warriors in order to deliber-
621 ate common affairs. This meeting, to which each one comes
613 armed, takes the name "agrao" as in the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ and the Moyen-Atlas /Middle Atlas/. Sometimes the chiefs of
[681] each of the important families put at the head of the khoms an
[671] amghar whose role is to see to the application of the customary law, to have the fines, or "insaf," paid, with which crimes are punished according to rules known by all, but not written. Like
[652] the moqaddem in the western Atlas, this amghar collects one third of the "insaf"; the other two parts go to the tribe.